Abstract-In order to collaborate large numbers of heterogeneous distributed devices over multiple domains within a modern large-scale device collaboration system, a fine-grained, flexible and secure approach is required for device authentication and authorization. This paper proposed a Multiple-Policy supported Attribute-Based Access Control model and its architecture to address these demands.
I. INTRODUCTION
Represented by the "Internet of Things" [1, 2] , largescale device collaboration systems have already applied into fields such as smart area management, disaster detection and analysis, intelligent resource planning, etc., where the environmental data can be obtained through the terminal devices and exchange via the open internet communication [3, 4, 5, 6] .
Large-scale device collaboration systems usually contain large numbers of heterogeneous devices and therefore need to process large scale realtime tasks and complex collaboration process. For example, the National seismological precursory network project achieved the collaborative observation of near 1000 seismological precursor devices, which come from the subdomains within 30 provinces, 300 stations in the scope of the nationwide. The landscape lighting control system of the Olympic Central Area need to process the orchestration of more than 20, 000 lightings to reach the artistic lighting and the lighting devices are controlled by different subsystems. In order to guarantee the security of device access, authentication and authorization, the large-scale device collaboration systems need functionalities such as cross-domain authentication, dynamic authorization and universal device description. But there are currently many challenges against these goals:
• Existing coarse-grained device access mechanism. Due to their processing and storage limits, most devices usually provide a single username and password for all the actions like device parameter setting, environmental data extracting, and device monitoring, which is very coarse-grained and therefore makes it difficult to grant multiple privilege levels by device itself.
• Device heterogeneity. Because of their heterogeneity and different passwords and usernames, a complex device collaboration process needs to query for every single device username and password so as to access the device. This can be quite annoying and inconvenient.
• Multiple policies combination. Because of the different ownership of the devices, it is possible to have multiple policies with different privileges on a device, which needs to be combined.
• Performance issue. As the increase of device amount involved within a single process, the authentication and authorization process can be very time-consuming with the traditional control approaches. All these deficits require a novel access control mechanism, which the traditional identity based access control models such as DAC (Discretionary Access Control) [7] , MAC (Mandatory Access Control) [8] , RBAC (Role Based Access Control) [9] are not effective because cross-domain authentication and authorization and more fine-grained policy description are required. Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [10] is a more flexible and scalable access control model as it is based on the attributes from user and resources. This paper proposes an attribute-based device access control architecture-Multiple-Policy supported Attribute-Based Access Control (MPABAC) to guarantee the device access control. This architecture supports cross-domain authentication and authorization, hierarchical policy combination and enforcement, unified device access control and fine-grained attributes-based privilege description.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes related work about device access control models, frameworks, and systems. Section III demonstrates the formalized model of MPABAC. Section IV presents the MPABAC Architecture and its implementation in detail. Section V gives experiments and performance evaluations and Section VI draws the conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
Since the early 1990s, ABAC has appeared with the development of Internet-based distributed application and new security mechanisms such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [11] . In ABAC, access decisions are based on attributes of the requestor and resource, and the authentication can be delayed until necessary because no pre-knowledge of the users are not necessary by the resources. In the following, we would introduce the ABAC in terms of models and algorithms, framework and systems.
A. ABAC Models
Wang et al and Lemay et al [12, 13] introduced logic programming theory for modeling attribute-based access control system and policy maintenance, therefore improving the faster policy transformation. Yuan and Tong [10] proposed the ABAC model in terms of policy model and architecture model and presented the mathematical formulation of the policy model. The paper also emphasized the importance of including environment attributes into the authentication process and discussed the benefits of using ABAC for Web Services. Shen and Hong [14] proposed an attribute-based access control model WS-ABAC to use attributes associated with subject, object and environment, and service parameters for access control measures in Web Services environment. The model exploited automated trust negotiation mechanism to address the disclosure issue of sensitive attributes. However, these works were not directly relevant to device access control.
Lang et al. [15] proposed a flexible ABAC model called ABMAC in Grid Computing. The model supported combination of multiple policies from both virtual organization level and local system level, and it also proposed a Globus Toolkit 4-based Attribute-Based Multi-policy Authorization Framework which integrate several existing PDP solutions such as SAML, GridMap and SAML. However this work did not consider the finegrained requirements of devices.
B. ABAC Framework
As one of the earliest work, Bonatti et al. [16] proposed a uniform attribute-based access control framework and model to regulate service access and information release in large-scale networks. With the defined access regulations, the framework supported modeling attribute certificates and reasoning about declarations and user-profiles that the server can maintain and exploit for taking the access decision. Damian et al. [17] then presented a privacy-enhanced authorization model and language containing new elements such as Subject expression, Object expression, Actions and Conditions, Purposes and Obligations to provide anonymity, pseudonymity, and therefore improving authorization. However, these works were not directly relevant to device access control.
Yu et al. [18] first realized a fine-grained attributebased data access control framework for wireless sensor network, FDAC (Fine-grained Distributed Access Control scheme). FDAC assigned each sensor node a set of attributes and each user with an extremely expressive access structure demonstrating his access capability. With this scheme, FDAC was able to provide security assurance such as resilience to user colluding and sensor compromising attacks as well as user revocability. However, FDAC considered only data access within sensor network; device control and monitoring are not considered.
C. ABAC Systems
Developed by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Akenti [19, 20] provided a distributed policybased authorization infrastructure for trust management. With X.509 certificates and TLS to establish authenticated secure connections, Akenti was able to use attribute certificates and delegated authorization. Akenti Policy was distributed and hierarchical, but it was not able to set dynamic access privilege limitations for a user during a session.
Developed under the European Commission PERMIS (PrivilEge and Role Management Infrastructure Standards validation) project, PERMIS [21, 22] was a standard X.509 attribute certificate-based Privilege Management Infrastructure. PERMIS was composed of Privilege Allocation subsystem and privilege verification subsystem and has it API for application. The privilege allocation subsystem was responsible of issuing X.509 role assignment attribute certificates to users and stores these in an LDAP directory. the privilege verification subsystem used the stored certificates for authenticating and authorizing the users. PERMIS was widely used in many European countries for privilege management, but still it was mainly for user-centered privilege management, but device control and monitoring were not considered.
Specified by the Internet2 middleware architecture committee, Shibboleth [23] was an attribute authority service. It authenticated users by their home sites and authorizes the user's access to the resource by the resource sites. Such separation of authorization and authentication functions eased the creation and management of federations of resource providers and users, for example, users could remain anonymous to the resource provider while accessing to resources. Shibboleth defined a protocol for transferring the authentication information and user attributes between the resource site and home site. However, Shibboleth's functionality was based on the simple trust relationship between the resource sites and user's home sites and therefore a more sophisticated authorization infrastructure than that provided by Shibboleth was required when considering dynamic delegation of authority and distributed management of user attributes.
Developed by The Virtual Organization Membership Service (VOMS) [24] granted authorization data to users at the VO level by providing support for group membership, roles and capabilities. However, VOMS did not address the need for dynamic, on-demand delegation or contexts information, which was essential for largescale device collaboration system.
III. MPABAC MODEL FORMALIZATION
As current large-scale device collaboration systems usually contain multiple domains, meanwhile, different from other resources, devices require more complex access control description, so it is essential to generate fine-grained access control policies and combine multiple policies from different domains to make a decision. Therefore we propose the MPABAC Model.
In MPABAC Model, access control decisions are made from the policies among multiple domains based on the attributes of entities such as subject, device, device manager, environment and actions. These entities and their attributes are described as below.
The entities of MPABAC Model: As each local domain may employ different security mechanism and therefore has its own policy description method, each policy is encapsulated as an independent atom policy to ensure the compatibility and scalability of MPABAC. The final decision is made of the combination of all these atom policies. What is more, as in some systems, the policies have different priorities for device control, so each MPABAC policies include a priority, suppose O is the maximum number of the privileges, then (9) With all the defined entities and their attributes, the policies can be described as below:
Single Policy:
Policyi ← (Subi×Devi×Envi×Acti, prii)
The combine function: 
IV. ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. MPABAC Architecture
The expressing, managing and enforcing authorizations for device access policies in a distributed environment require the presence of an architecture that supports distributed policy creation, evaluation and user authentication. EXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [25] defines a general policy description language and an access decision language. XACML is composed of PAP (Policy Administration Point), PDP (Policy Decision Point) and PEP (Policy Enforcement Point), PIP (Policy Information Point). PAP is the entity that is responsible for policy creation, storage and extraction, making the policies available to PDP. PDP is to issue an appropriate decision response based on the available policy from PAP and the attributes collected by PIP. PEP is the entity that grants or denies access in accordance with the policy decision from PDP. XACML is able to evaluate the access request dynamically and authorize in accordance with the resource, user identity and environment, therefore serves as a good vehicle for attribute-based access control and fits nicely with our architecture. Fig. 1 
B. Hierarchical PDP Structure
As the large-scale device collaboration systems usually include more than one administrative domain, so we employ a hierarchical structure for cross-domain authentication and authorization.
In our Architecture, there are MasterPDP and LocalPDP. MasterPDP is the Upper Layer for authentication and authorization, it is to receive the authorization request from PEP and parse it into multiple XACML authentication requests according to the related domains. in the Local Domain Layer, there are the LocalPDPs, each LocalPDPs is able to use its own authentication policies, The privilege of this looselycoupled distributed authentication structure is to support multiple policies among different domains.
C. Device-independent Device Manager
There are a large number of heterogeneous devices within large-scale device collaboration systems, furthermore, different from traditional computing resources or web service resources, device access actions include multiple categories and parameters, for example, ParameterSet, which are the commands for setting working parameters of devices such as device time, device password, IP address and etc. DataQuery represents the commands to query data from devices, such as the temperature, water level, etc., or StateMonitor represents the commands for querying the state of devices, such as its power status, voltage status, SNTP time, etc., which makes it nearly impossible to maintain all the access commands in the Upper Layer. Because of all these complexities, we propose a device-independent Device Manager for distributed device access information management.
We define a XML-based Device Object to describe device and its access commands. As shown in Fig 2, it stores all the commands and access information such as user name and password to the device. Because of its importance, it is encrypted and only accessible to the local Device Manager. Every time when the Device Manager receives an authorized request from the Authorization Engine, it generates the corresponding commands script from this Object and conduct the access process. As with the corresponding Device Object file, the Device Manager is able to control that device, which allows the simple plug-in implementation when adding new devices. 
D. Priority Description
XACML does not directly support priorities between different policies. But in production environment, because of administrative relationships, policies from different PAPs may not be equally important, it requires priority ranking among the multiple related policies when making to a decision.
We categorize the policies into two different scopes, including the local domain scope (LocalPolicy) and the meta layer scope (MetaLayerPolicy), then different priorities are set depending on the administration strategies. For example, in more central-controlled systems, the Upper Layer scope should own higher priority than the Local Domain Layer, so as to enforce the controlling strategies, and probably each local domain should own equal priority, in federation environment where multiple domains are more independent, the meta layer and other domains should own lower priority than the local domain. As shown in Fig. 3 , we set Priority as the CombinerParameter in the XACML PolicySet description so that each policy is attached with a priority. 
A. Authentication Duration Test
The efficiency of our implementation depends largely on the timespan of the authentication process. According to our algorithm design, the authentication process are influenced by both the number of resource and the number of policy, what is more, it takes different time to generate command scripts for different actions ( ParameterSet, DataQuery and StateMonitor), therefore we conducted several experiments to test the duration of authentication process with all these three factors included.
As is shown in Fig. 5 -Fig. 8 , with the one resource and different number of policies (in this test we take 30 policies), every action needs a relative smaller duration (the mean value at around 120 ms), and the number of the policies does not give very obvious influence. The same rule stands for multiple resources (in this test we take 200 resources) with different number of policies (mean value at around 530 ms). However, there is an large increase in both mean time and the standard deviation, for example, compared with the ParameterSet action in Figure c) , the same action in Figure a) has an increase of 410 ms in the duration mean value and an increase of 965 ms in the standard deviation. So it is clear that the time spent for authentication process lasts longer when there are more resources involved. 
B. Authentication Duration Test
From the above test, we conclude the number of resources has the most obvious impact on authentication duration, therefore we also conducted the scalability test, to test the authentication duration time with different number of resources.
In Fig. 9 , we analyze the correlation between the number of resources and the duration time. Obviously the duration time increases with the number of resources. When the number of resources is under 4000, the duration time is under 1 second and increases quite slowly, but after 4000, the duration time increases very quickly. As most of the large-scale device collaboration systems have around 5000 devices, this reflects that our results are acceptable in production environment. 
VI. ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION
Fine-grained authentication and authorization in largescale multi-domain device collaboration systems are important security issues. While the traditional MAC, DAC and RBAC models are not sufficient for this, ABAC can be a promising approach. In this paper we proposed MPABAC architecture to realize this by supporting prioritized hierarchical policies combination and enforcement among multiple domains, unified device access control and fine-grained attributes-based privilege description.
Our experiments demonstrate that the overhead exposed by our system is acceptable and that the system scales under load. The duration time of the authentication process depend on the number of resources in the system. Our experiments show that the duration lasts less than 1 second and scales quite well when the device number is under 4000.
In the future, we will investigate more algorithms for policy combination and perform experimental assessments when applying it on real large-scale device collaboration system scenarios.
